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NOTES
United States v. Piccinonna: The
Eleventh Circuit Adds Another
Approach to Polygraph Evidence in the
Federal System
INTRODUCTION
The Moor is of a free and open nature,
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so;
And will as tenderly be led by th' nose
As asses are.'
Unlike Othello, in lago's assessment, the law is not willing to
be "tenderly led by th' nose." In fact, the law constantly seeks
better ways to evaluate witness credibility. Professor Wigmore
stated, "If there is ever devised a psychological test for the valu-
ation of witness credibility, the law will run to meet it.' ' 2 When
litigants have offered polygraph evidence to the courts as just such
a psychological test for the evaluation of witness credibility, how-
ever, the law has hardly "run to meet it." In Frye v. United
States,3 an opinion that became the landmark case concerning the
admissibility of expert testimony based on novel scientific evidence,
the first federal court of appeals confronted with expert testimony
based on a predecessor of the modern polygraph held the evidence
inadmissible because the scientific principles underlying the test
were not "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which [polygraph evidence] belongs. ' '4
In addition to establishing the standard of admissibility for
novel scientific evidence, 5 Frye barred polygraph evidence from the
SHAKESPEARE, The Tragedy of Othello the Moor of Venice, act I sc. 3, lines 390-
94. j. WimoRE, WioMoRE ON EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed. 1935), cited in Sevilla, Polygraph
1984: Behind the Closed Door of Admissibility, 16 U. WEsT L.A. L. REv. 5, 6 (1984).
3 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5 The Frye rule is no longer followed by all of the federal circuits. Some believe that
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federal courts for the next fifty years. 6 The case marked the de-
parture point for the polygraph's tortured odyssey toward judicial
legitimacy. In the early 1970s, it seemed that progress was being
made. Three federal district courts indicated their belief that expert
polygraph testimony should be admissible in certain circumstances .
By 1984, however, one commentator noted, "[T]he promising trend
of the 70's ... subsided and the courts .. .reverted to an abso-
lutist position of exclusion." 8
the 1975 enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 superseded Frye, establishing a more
flexible standard of admissibility. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d
Cir. 1985) (rejecting the Frye test); United States v. Mustafa, 22 M.J. 165, 167 n.3 (C.M.A.)
(construing Military Rule of Evidence 702, which is worded identically to Federal Rule of
Evidence 702), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 953 (1986). In Downing, the Third Circuit described
the proper inquiry as follows:
First, the evidence must survive preliminary scrutiny in the course of an in
limine proceeding conducted by the district judge. This threshold inquiry,
which we derive from the helpfulness standard of Rule 702, is essentially a
balancing test, centering on two factors: (1) the reliability of the scientific
principles upon which the expert testimony rests, hence the potential of the
testimony to aid the jury in reaching an accurate resolution of a disputed
issue; and (2) the likelihood that introduction of the testimony may in some
way overwhelm or mislead the jury, Second, admission depends upon the
"fit," i.e., upon a specific proffer showing that scientific research has estab-
lished that particular features of the eyewitness identifications involved may
have impaired the accuracy of those identifications. -[The Downing case in-
volved the admissibility of testimony by an expert in the field of human
perception and memory, concerning the reliability of certain eyewitness iden-
tifications.] The district court's assessment of these factors will guide its
discretion in deciding whether to admit the evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 702,
which contemplates a liberal view toward the admissibility of expert testimony
generally. ... Finally, the district court retains discretionary authority under
Fed. R. Evid. 403 to exclude any relevant evidence that would unduly waste
time or confuse the issues at trial.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226.
Other courts hold that the Frye test was incorporated in Rule 702. See, e.g., United
States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1986); Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1984). Although the Supreme Court has
refused to review this issue, Justices White and Brennan would have granted certiorari "to
resolve this conflict on an obviously recurring and important issue." Mustafa v. United
States, 479 U.S. 953 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
6 See Sevilla, supra note 2, at 7.
See Sevilla, supra note 2, at 8-9. Mr. Sevilla points first to United States v. De
Betham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 907 (1973), wherein the district court indicated that some polygraph evidence
shouldfbe admissible, but felt that Ninth Circuit precedent required exclusion. In Mr.
Sevilla's second case, United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972), excul-
patory polygraph evidence was admitted, subject to certain conditions. Finally, in United
States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the
district court admitted exculpatory polygraph evidence, but was promptly reversed by the
D.C. Circuit.
I Sevilla, supra note 2, at 11.
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In 1989, the Eleventh Circuit countered this trend with its
decision in United States v. Piccinonna.9 In an en banc opinion,
the court became the first in the federal system to prescribe an
approach to polygraph evidence that had been adopted more than
a decade earlier by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.'0
This approach allows the admission of polygraph testimony, sub-
ject to the wise discretion of the trial judge, "to impeach or
corroborate the testimony of a witness at trial,"" or where the
parties make a stipulation articulating the scope and purposes for
its admission. This represents a substantial step toward judicial
legitimacy for polygraph evidence and indicates the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's belief that polygraph evidence has nearly achieved Frye's
"general acceptance" standard.
Including the approach adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, at
least five distinct approaches to polygraph evidence exist among
the federal courts. First, "the Fourth, Fifth, and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits historically have adhered to the traditional ap-
proach of per se inadmissibility."'' 2 Second, the Eighth Circuit,
possibly joined by the Seventh Circuit, follows an approach, which
apparently originated in Arizona,'3 that gives "the trial court...
the discretion to receive polygraph testimony if the parties stipu-
late[ to the admission of the results prior to the testing and if
certain other conditions are met."'14 Some of the courts adopting
this approach allow polygraph evidence only for limited purposes. 15
9 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
10 See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1535-37 (11th Cir. 1989). The
adopted approach first appeared in Commonwealth v. Vitello, 381 N.E.2d 582 (Mass. 1978)
(later overruled by Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989)).
-" Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536.
12 Id. at 1534 (citing United States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1984)); see
United States v. Clark, 598 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 622 F.2d 917 (1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1128 (1981); United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Many state court systems follow this approach. See Pulakis v. State, 476,
P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970); People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 362 (Colo. 1981); People
v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1071 (Ill. 1981); Conley v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 865,
867 (Ky. 1964); State v. Mitchell, 402 A.2d 479, 482 (Me. 1979); Kelley v. State, 418 A.2d
217, 219 (Md. 1980); State v. Beachman, 616 P.2d 337, 339 (Mont. 1980); State v. Biddle,
599 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Mo. 1980) (en banc); State v. Steinmark, 239 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Neb.
1976); Birdsong v. State, 649 P.2d 786, 788 (OkI. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Frazier, 252
S.E.2d 39, 49 (W. Va. 1979); State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 (Wis. 1981).
" See State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (Ariz. 1962).
14 C.T. MCCORMICK, McCoRaMCK oN EVIENCE § 206, at 629 (E.W. Cleary rev. ed.
1984).
" For examples of the stipulation approach, see Anderson v. United States, 788 F.2d
517, 519 n.l (8th Cir. 1986); McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
1990-91]
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The third approach, followed by the Third, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits,16 permits admission of polygraph evi-
dence "when special circumstances exist. ' ' 17 The common thread
among these cases relates only indirectly to polygraph evidence;
they involve situations where willingness or refusal to take a pol-
ygraph, or the fact that a polygraph examination was made, is.
somehow relevant to a fact other than the witness's truthfulness.'8
This use implicates the reliability of the polygraph only insofar as
the defendant's belief in its reliability is important.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the fourth approach in Picci-
nonna.19 Under this approach, previously adopted in Massachu-
setts,20 polygraph evidence is admissible only for the impeachment
or corroboration of a witness at trial.
The final approach makes "admissibility even in the absence.
of a stipulation ... discretionary with the trial judge.''21 In the
federal system, only the Courts of Military Justice follow this
approach.22
denied, 455 U.S. 967 (1982); United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976). Several state court systems follow this approach. See
State v. Trotter, 514 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ariz. 1973); Valdez, 371 P.2d at 900; State v..
Bullock, 557 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Ark. 1977); People v. Trujillo, 136 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1977); Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. 1975); Pavone v. State, 402
N.E.2d 976, 978-79 (Ind. 1980); State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 586 (Iowa 1980); State v.
Roach, 576 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Kan. 1978); State v. Milano, 256 S.E.2d 154, 162 (N.C. 1979);
State v. Christopher, 339 A.2d 239, 240-41 (N.J. 1975); State v. Souel, 372 N.E.2d 1318,
1323-24 (Ohio 1978); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 457 (Wyo. 1977).
16 See United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Bowen, 857 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1988); Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F.2d 970, 972 (6th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 109 S. Ct. 1035 (1988); United States v. Johnson,
816 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1416-17 (10th Cir.
1986); United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 954 (1980). Support for this approach also may be found in the state courts. See
Tanner v. State, 532 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Ark. 1976); Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798, 801
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); People v. Lettrich, 108 N.E.2d 488, 491 (Ill. 1952); Johnson v.
State, 355 A.2d 504, 507 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Leeks v. State, 245 P.2d 764, 770-71
(Okla. Crim. App. 1952).
11 Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1535 (citing cases).
18 See, e.g., Miller, 874 F.2d at 1259-63 (allowing admission of polygraph evidence
solely to explain sequence of events, where a defendant challenged the reliability of admis-
sions made after being informed that he had failed a polygraph test).
1 See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1535-37.
20 See Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 597-99.
1, C.T. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at 629.
12 See United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 253-54 (C.M.A. 1987). This approach
has also been adopted in New Mexico. See State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204-05 (N.M. 1975).
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Obviously, the admissibility of polygraph evidence is the subject
of ongoing controversy among courts and commentators. 24 Pic-
cinonna, with its liberal approach, lies near the forefront of this
controversy. This Note examines and evaluates the various ap-
proaches to the admissibility of polygraph evidence. First, a brief
description of the polygraph and its operation is offered.25 This
leads into a summary of the theory underlying, and the criticisms
aimed at, the polygraph technique. 26 An evaluation of the sound-
ness of reasoning offered by courts when passing on the admissi-
bility of polygraph evidence follows. 27 The reasoning offered by
courts is then used to examine and criticize their approaches to the
evidence. 8 The Note shows that the Piccinonna approach best
reconciles the competition between the government interest in bar-
ring unreliable evidence and the requirements of the due process
and compulsory process clauses of the Constitution. 29 Additionally,
by criticizing the various approaches, the Note demonstrates that
the diversity among the federal circuits' approaches to scientific
evidence in general ° has obscured the already muddled jurispru-
dence surrounding polygraph evidence.31
I. THE POLYGRAPH DEVICE AND ITS OPERATION
Deception detection tests are hardly new. "It is said that more
than 4000 years ago the Chinese would try the accused in the
presence of a physician who, listening or feeling for a change in
the heartbeat, would announce whether the accused was testifying
truthfully. 3 2 Others believed that a dry mouth better indicated
deception. Dry mouth tests required suspected liars to chew rice
flour, lick a hot iron, or swallow a slice of bread and cheese. If
the rice flour remained dry, the hot iron burned the suspected liar's
2 See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
2, See, e.g., C.T. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 206, at 626; Jung, Polygraph Evidence
in Federal Criminal Trials After United States v. Piccinonna, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1990, at 49;
Sevilla, supra note 2; Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of
Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961).
2 See infra notes 32-51 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
-1 See infra notes 70-143 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 144-223 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
30 See supra note 5.
3, See infra notes 70-143 and accompanying text.
32 C.T. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 206, at 625.
1990-91]
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tongue, or the suspected liar was unable to swallow the bread and
cheese, it was believed that deception had been revealed.3 3 Simi-
larly, native Americans are said to have required the accused to
chew rice, then spit it out. If the rice stuck to the accused's gums,
he was condemned as a liar.3 4
These ancient tests are the progenitors of the polygraph, and
share with it a common underlying theory:
The theory of lie detection can be summarized: the act of lying
leads to conscious conflict; conflict induces fear or anxiety, which
in turn results in clearly measurable physiological change.
35
Before undertaking an examination of the theory underlying the
polygraph technique, an explanation of the workings of the device
is necessary.
A. The Mechanics of the Polygraph Technique
A polygraph monitors and records certain physiological data
while an examiner questions the subject. 36 Typically, a polygraph
consists of devices that monitor and record changes in blood pres-
sure, pulse, respiration, and galvanic skin response37 (which meas-
ures perspiration).38 Some versions include evaluation of certain
muscular activity, to frustrate the use of countermeasures. 39 The
examination occurs in a quiet room.4° The mechanics of the poly-
" See M.J. SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 192 (1978).
34 See Skolnick, supra note 24, at 696.
35 Id. at 699-700; see also United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1537 (11th Cir.
1989) (Johnson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (stating that the basic
assumptions underlying the polygraph are "that telling lies is stressful, and that this stress
manifests itself in physiological responses which can be recorded on a polygraph"); Com-
monwealth v. Vitello, 381 N.E.2d 582, 586 (Mass. 1978) (arguing that lying or deceiving
leads to conscious conflict, which induces fear or anxiety, resulting in measurable physio-
logical changes); M.J. SAKs & R. HASTIE, supra note 33, at 192 (noting that efforts to
deceive are accompanied by emotional arousal, which manifests itself in uncontrollable
physiological signs); Sevilla, supra note 2, at 21 ("[Ihe fear of detection of deception
produces physiological responses which can be measured and interpreted.").
The agreement in these authorities shows that, in contrast with the controversy sur-
rounding most aspects of the polygraph technique, there is substantial unanimity as to the
content of its underlying theory. It is the validity of that theory, however, that is disputed.
6 See C.T. McCoRMcCK, supra note 14, § 206, at 625-26.
1, This is also referred to as "electrodermal response" or "skin conductance re-
sponse." See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-TM-H-15, SCIEN-
TIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TEsTING: A RESEARCH REvEw ANDEVALUATION-A TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM 11 (Nov. 1983) [hereinafter OTA MEMORANDUM].
11 See J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 5 (2d ed. 1977).
19 Countermeasures are actions undertaken by the examinee to fool the polygraph
examiner.
- See J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 38, at 5-6.
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graph technique have generated no significant controversy; no one
seriously contends that the polygraph machine, when competently
operated, fails to measure blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and
perspiration accurately.
The examination generally consists of a pretest interview, the
questioning, and then a post-test interview. The pretest interview
provides subjects with information about the examination, informs
subjects of their legal rights, allows the examiner to assess the
effects of special subject conditions, such as medical problems or
use of drugs, and convinces the subject that the examiner will
detect any attempt at deception.4 This conviction of infallibility
should heighten the subject's physiological reactions during the
test.42 Additionally, the actual test questions are previewed to clear
important questions, allowing the subject to inform the examiner,
in advance, of reasons for strong reactions to certain questions.
43
The pretest interview is followed by the questioning, during
which the polygraph machine monitors and records the subject's
physiological responses. The questioning may be preceded by what
is known as the "card test," to further enhance the subject's belief
in the infallibility of the test.44 The structure of the questioning
may take any of several forms. 4- Examiners use three basic types
of inquiries: relevant questions, irrelevant or control questions, and
guilty knowledge or concealed information questions. The irrele-
vant or control questions allow the examiner to record the subject's
baseline physiological responses, for comparison with his physio-
logical responses to the relevant or concealed information ques-
tions. Relevant questions directly pertain to the issue under
investigation. Concealed information questions, often framed as
multiple choice questions, allow the examiner to see if the subject
exhibits a stronger response when confronted with information the
significance of which only a "guilty" subject could know. For
4 See id. at 13-24.
41 Skolnick, supra note 24, at 704-05.
41 M.J. SAKS & R. HAsTIm, supra note 33, at 193.
" The "card test" requires the subject to choose one from a series of numbered
cards. The subject does not reveal his choice, but the cards are marked or arranged so that
the examiner knows which card was picked. While the machine is operating, the examiner
asks the subject if each card is the chosen one. The subject is instructed to respond "No"
to each card, even the card he chose. The examiner then studies the chart produced by the
machine, telling the subject which card he picked. See J. REaD & F. INBAu, supra note 38,
at 42-43; OTA NlEMORRANum, supra note 37, at 14.
" See J. REID & F. INBAu, supra note 38, at 38-59 (describing various questioning
structures).
1990-91]
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example, if an investigation concerned a poisoning by arsenic, and
only the poisoner and the authorities knew that the poisoner used
arsenic, the examiner might state, "The victim died from poisoning
by a) strychnine, b) heroin, c) arsenic, or d) Drano." If the subject
responds strongly to arsenic, then it might be inferred that he has
"guilty knowledge" and is being deceptive. 46
The questioning is followed by the post-test interview, when
the examiner discusses the test with the subject. He allows the
subject to clarify responses. If the examiner concludes that the
subject was deceptive, he may attempt to obtain a confession. 47
B. The Role of the Examiner
The polygraph is not the simplistic lie detector that some might
envision; no light automatically illuminates each time the subject
offers a deceptive response. At a minimum, the test requires the
examiner to interpret, subjectively, the graphs produced by the
machine in an effort to determine whether the subject offered
deceptive responses." Many examiners evaluate the subject's de-
meanor, attitude, and responses to comments and questions from
the time of first contact to the conclusion of the examination.
From these subjective evaluations, the examiner makes preliminary
judgments regarding the truthfulness of the subject. 49 For these
reasons, "[T]he most important factor involved in the use of [the
polygraph technique] is the ability, experience, education, and in-
tegrity of the examiner himself. ' 50 Thus, as one might expect,
accuracy increases with examiner experience. 51
46 See OTA MEMORANDUM, supra note 37, at 14-17.
47 See id. at 23. Such confessions lead to an interesting issue regarding polygraph
evidence. If the subject contests the reliability of his confession at trial, may the prosecution
introduce evidence showing that the confession was made after the subject was informed
that he had just failed a polygraph test? This issue is discussed infra notes 158-69 and
accompanying text.
41 Apparently, some examiners rely exclusively on chart interpretation. See OTA
MEMORANDuM, supra note 37, at 23. This is the most objective method of polygraph testing.
41 See J. RDm & F. INBAU, supra note 38, at 13-61.
,o Id. at 5.
11 See J. REIn & F. IaNAu, supra note 38, at 392; OTA MEMoAN-Dutm, supra note
37, at 83-84 (citing field studies that correlate greater experience with increased accuracy);
cf. S. REP. No. 284, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 42, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN.
NEws 726, 729 ("[m]ost examiners base their conclusion on the conduct of the examinee,
the natural inclinations of the examiner, and on statements made during the examination.").
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C. The Theory Underlying the Polygraph Test
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the polygraph tech-
nique concerns the validity of its underlying theory and the con-
sequential accuracy and reliability of its results. 52 As noted
previously:
The theory of lie detection can be summarized: the act of lying
leads to conscious conflict; conflict induces fear or anxiety, which
in turn results in clearly measurable physiological change. 3
The underlying theory necessarily assumes the existence of a regular
relationship between deception and certain emotional states, and a
regular relationship between these emotional states and certain
bodily changes.54
These assumptions, the accuracy of which determines the theo-
ry's validity and reliability, have suffered criticism from judges
and commentators. Dissenting in United States v. Piccinonna, Judge
Johnson pointed out that some "individuals can learn to control
their physiological responses and ... during the polygraph test
these people could portray themselves as truthful when they are
not."55 Judge Johnson also argued that the act of lying does not
necessarily trigger specific emotions and that, even if evoked, these
specific emotions may not trigger set patterns of physiological
responses reflecting dishonesty.5 6 Almost thirty years ago, one com-
mentator noted that lying may lead to a variety of emotional states,
including not only stress or anxiety, but also humor, excitement,
boredom, and satisfaction.5 7 Any poker player knows that if his
mouth goes dry, his voice trembles, his face blushes, and he begins
to sweat every time he tries to bluff his way into a big pot, he
probably will lose. Good players learn to control and manipulate
these physiological signs to their benefit.
The polygraph technique represents the product of thousands
of years of refinement on the theory and assumptions underlying
ancient deception detection techniques. The theory and underlying
52 See Skolnick, supra note 24, at 699-704.
11 See supra note 35.
14 See Skolnick, supra note 24, at 700.
55 Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1538 (citing Ney, Expressing Emotions and Controlling
Feelings, in Tn POLYGRAPH TEST: LiEs, TRuTH AND SCIENCE 65 (A. Gale ed. 1988)).
16 Id. at 1539; see also Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 586 (questioning the existence of a
relationship between deception and physiological changes in the body).
17 See Skolnick, supra note 24, at 700.
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assumptions suffer strong criticisms, however, based on empirical
research and notions of common sense. The failure to resolve these
criticisms during the thousands of years of lie detection makes the
prospect of a near term resolution unlikely. Courts expecting the
appropriate scientific community to accept the theory and its un-
derlying assumptions wholeheartedly in the near future are destined
for disappointment.58 The Frye standard, however, states only a
proxy for fundamental evidentiary concerns that the polygraph
may in fact satisfy.
D. The Accuracy and Validity of the Polygraph Test
Three factors complicate any assessment of the polygraph's
accuracy. First, only two possible outcomes of the test exist; either
the subject is truthful or untruthful. A test that would randomly
label a subject as truthful or untruthful should correctly determine
the truthfulness of examinees fifty percent of the time, ceteris
paribus5 9 Thus, if a polygraph examination correctly determines
truthfulness only fifty percent of the time, then it is no more
accurate than the toss of a coin should be. Second, because the
polygraph test's true accuracy depends on correctly identifying not
only untruthful examinees, but also truthful examinees, no single
figure can fully express its precision.60 Full expression of the po-
lygraph's accuracy requires not only a determination of accuracy
in detecting untruthfulness, but also accuracy in detecting truth-
fulness. Finally, this leads to the third factor. It is impossible to
determine the degree to which the examiner's conclusion is influ-
enced by factors outside of the polygraph examination-such as
personal knowledge of impeaching or corroborating circumstances
or the plausibility of the examinee's story. Nevertheless, several
empirical studies have attempted to determine the accuracy of the
polygraph technique, arriving at disparate conclusions. 6'
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35, 41 (Mass. 1989) (While
overruling Vitello, the court stated that it had earlier taken a .'cautious first step' in the
hope, if not expectation, that the development of polygraphic testing would soon reach the
stage where it would be generally accepted by the appropriate scientific community.").
9 See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1540 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part).
6 Id. Judge Johnson noted, "[A] polygraph examiner who accused every subject of
lying would be 100% accurate at detecting liars. His accuracy at detecting those who are
truthful, however, would be unacceptably low." Id. at n.7.
61 See generally OTA MEMORANDUM, supra note 37. The Office of Technology As-
sessment's memorandum undertakes an examination and analysis of several field studies. It
[VOL. 80
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In a field study conducted by Frank Horvath and John Reid,
ten examiners correctly identified guilty and innocent subjects an
average of 87.75% of the time.6 2 Another examiner claims he
conducted over 50,000 examinations with greater that 90% accu-
racy, verified by admissions, confessions, or additional evidence. 63
A third source claims that, when properly applied by a competent
examiner, the polygraph technique obtains an error rate of less
than 1%.6 In contrast to these rather optimistic assessments, one
noted commentator states, "[M]ost psychologists reviewing the
literature ... suggest figures in the 63-72% range .... -65
Probably the most detailed and unbiased examination of the
polygraph technique's accuracy is contained in a technical memo-
randum prepared for the United States Congress by the Office of
Technology Assessment [hereinafter OTA] .66 After identifying six
reviews of field studies, ten individual field studies, and fourteen
individual analog studies that met minimum scientific standards,
the OTA reported average accuracies that ranged from a low of
57.9% to a high of 98%.67 From these voluminous studies, the
OTA concluded only that "the polygraph detects deception at a
also provides a detailed and ostensibly unbiased examination of the various techniques used
in these field studies. See id. at 47-102. Evaluation of the relative merits of one field study
over another is beyond the scope of this Note.
Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and
Deception, in J. REm & F. INBAu, supra note 38, at 389, 391-92.
6 See United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 737 n. 9 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 973 (1976).
6, See J. MOESSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTmc EVIDENCE IN CRMNAL CASES § 14.09, at
616 (2d ed. 1978).
65 C.T. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at 626-27 (citing D. LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE
BLOOD: UsEs AND ABUSES OF Tm Lm DETECTOR 25
(1981); Lykken, The Detection of Deception, 86 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 47 (1977)).
66 See OTA MEMORANDUM, supra note 37.
67 The results, for research on the control question technique in specific incident
criminal investigations, are sunimarized below:
-Six prior reviews of field studies:
-average accuracy ranged from 64 to 98%.
-Ten individual field studies:
-correct guilty detections ranged from 70.6 to 98.6%, averaging 86.3%;
-correct innocent detections ranged from 12.5 to 94.1%, averaging 76%;
-false positive rate (innocent persons found deceptive) ranged from 0 to 75%, averaging
19.1%; and,
-false negative rate (guilty persons found nondeceptive) ranged from 0 to 29.4%,
averaging 10.2%.
-Fourteen individual analog studies:
-correct guilty detections ranged from 35.4 to 100%, averaging 63.7%;
-correct innocent detections ranged from 32 to 91%, averaging 57.9%;
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rate better than chance, but with error rates that could be consid-
ered significant.'"68
At this point, it should be apparent that the polygraph's ac-
curacy is widely disputed. It also should be apparent that attempts
by courts to determine definitively the accuracy of the polygraph
technique serve only as detours along the odyssey of polygraph
evidence toward judicial legitimacy. These detours require unprec-
edented levels of appellate fact finding and lead to a mass of
arcane sociological and psychological theories from which no co-
herent law can emerge.69 Nevertheless, courts confront polygraph
evidence frequently. The next section of this Note examines, and
appraises the soundness of, concerns courts voice when discussing
polygraph evidence.
II. JUDICIAL CONCERNS ABOUT POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
The first courts confronted with polygraph evidence gave it an
unsympathetic reception.70 Since Frye v. United States,7' announced
in 1923, however, courts have reexamined the admissibility of
polygraph evidence. Courts have adopted at least five distinct
approaches to the issue, all of which may be found within the
federal system. This section of the Note examines the concerns
courts voice about polygraph evidence. This examination is fol-
lowed by an analysis and critique of the approaches courts take to
polygraph evidence, in light of the valid concerns addressed in this
section.
A. Relevancy-Federal Rule of Evidence 402 Concerns
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 imposes the first hurdle to ad-
missibility that polygraph evidence must overcome. 72 The Rules
-false positives ranged from 2 to 50.7%, averaging 14.1%; and,
-false negatives ranged from 0 to 28.7%, averaging 10.4%.
Id. at 97, cited in Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1540.
68 Id.
0 See Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CoRNELL L.
REv. 817 (1976-77).
70 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
7, For a discussion, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
72 Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evi-
dence which is not relevant is not admissible.
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define relevant evidence as that having "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." ' 73 Assuming that proffered polygraph evi-
dence relates somehow to an issue of consequence, it clears this
low relevancy hurdle. To make the existence of a fact more prob-
able or less probable than it would be without the evidence, the
polygraph technique need only detect deception at a rate better
than chance. The OTA found that the polygraph technique does
just that, although with error rates that could be considered sig-
nificant. 74 Thus, polygraph evidence clears the initial relevancy
hurdle.
B. Prejudice, Confusion, and Waste of Time-Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 Concerns
Once polygraph evidence clears the relevancy hurdle, it must
overcome the balancing test inherent in Federal Rule of Evidence
403.7- The Rule requires that the probative value of offered evi-
dence not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice, waste of time, or confusion of the issues. Probative
value measures tendency to prove ultimate facts. 76 Each of the
facets of this rule is discussed below. As is demonstrated, the
concerns raised by Rule 403 are fact specific, and therefore, cannot
justify a general rule of inadmissibility for polygraph evidence.
1. Confusion of the Issues
Courts frequently express concern that admission of expert
polygraph testimony will confuse the issues. 77 The thrust of this
73 FED. R. Evmo. 401; see also People v. Adamson, 165 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1946) (illustrating
the degree of ease with which the low relevancy hurdle is cleared), aff'd 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
7, See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
11 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
76 See Johnson v. Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co., 50 S.W.2d 16, 16 (Ky. 1932).
7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35, 41 (Mass. 1989) (holding that
potential for jury confusion is a policy consideration in evaluating polygraph evidence);
Commonwealth v. Vitello, 381 N.E.2d 582, 592 (Mass. 1978) (arguing that the most often
cited reason for close scrutiny of polygraph evidence is jury confusion).
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argument states that, instead of focusing on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant, the trial will become entangled in a battle of
experts over the proper weight to afford polygraph testimony. The
problem is an obvious and common one. The prosecution offers
inculpatory polygraph evidence through an expert, who praises the
accuracy and reliability of the polygraph technique, offering de-
tailed psychological and scientific explanations. The defense then
rebuts through its own expert, who offers technical, psychological,
and scientific explanations to support his testimony that the poly-
graph technique produces grossly inaccurate and unreliable results.
The jury, whose members likely know little of science or psychol-
ogy, become mired in a debate on the merits of the polygraph
technique, a debate whose rational solution lies far beyond the
jury's understanding. In the meantime, the object of the trial-the
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence-is neglected.
This criticism argues too much, for it applies equally to expert
polygraph testimony and to expert scientific evidence generally.
Judge Learned Hand recognized that the adversarial process is not
the ideal setting for the presentation and resolution of conflicting
scientific theories:
The result is that the ordinary means successful to aid the jury
in getting at the facts, aid, instead of that, in confusing them.
The trouble with all this is that it is setting the jury to decide,
where doctors disagree. The whole object of the expert is to tell
the jury, not facts, as we have seen, but general truths derived
from his specialized experience. But how can the jury judge
between two statements each founded upon an experience con-
fessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are
incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all .7
A jury, or even a judge, is probably not the ideal arbiter of
technical disputes upon which experts are unable to agree.7 9
Clearly, polygraph testimony presents great potential for con-
fusion of the issues. But, it is equally clear that most if not all of
this potential stems not from some characteristic unique to poly-
78 Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARv. L. REv. 40, 53-54 (1902).
71 See generally Bazelon, supra note 69 (discussing a "science court" for the deter-
mination of disputed scientific issues); Harris, Complex Protect Design Litigation: A Need
for More Capable Fact-Finders, 79 Ky. L.J. 477 (1990-91) (noting limits on juries' capa-
bilities to decide complex issues).
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graph evidence, but from the law governing expert scientific testi-
mony generally. Since the law plainly contemplates that not all
expert testimony should be excluded as too likely to lead to issue
confusion, this concern can support exclusion only where there is
something more to confuse the jury, where the specific facts of the
case require it. The confusion of the issues concern can not support
the wholesale exclusion of polygraph evidence.
2. Unfair Prejudice
The unfair prejudice condemned by Rule 402 does not include
all evidence damaging to one party. Rather, "'Unfair prejudice'
within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one."8 0 In this context, the unfair prejudice concern condemns
polygraph evidence not because it suggests decision on an emotional
basis, but because "jurors would be unduly impressed with the
scientific testimony on a crucial and typically determinative mat-
ter."8 ' Courts often raise this concern.82 One court claims:
When polygraph evidence is offered in evidence at trial, it is likely
to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the
ancient oracle of Delphi .... To the extent that the polygraph
results are accepted as unimpeachable or conclusive by jurors,
despite cautionary instructions by the trial judge, the jurors'
traditional responsibility to collectively ascertain the facts and
collectively adjudge guilt or innocence is preempted.8"
These cases seem to indicate that courts believe that the presenta-
tion of polygraph evidence is especially likely to lead jurors to
10 FED. R. Evio. 403 advisory committee's note.
1, C.T. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 206, at 630.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Falsia, 724 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing the
polygraph's "misleading appearance of accuracy"); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d
161, 168 (8th Cir 1975) (noting the polygraph's "aura of near infallibility"); United States
v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that trial court properly rejected
"electrical oath-helper"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973).
"1 Alexander, 526 F.2d at 168. Judge Learned Hand made a similar argument as to
expert testimony in general, stating that the position of the expert witness gives rise to a
legal anomaly. Normally, one party puts in evidence a number of facts from which he
hopes the jury will make a desired inference. The opposition then puts in evidence certain
facts from which it hopes the jury will make a different inference. To these minor premises
the jury members apply their common knowledge to decide what inference they should
make. The general rules, which the jury supplies from their own knowledge, are the major
premises. The expert witness, unlike most witnesses, supplies major premises-general rules
with which to determine which inference to make. See Hand, supra note 78, at 50-52.
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abdicate their traditional responsibilities. This belief is unsound.
Polygraph based expert testimony has no special ability to reach
into the jury room and control jurors' deliberations. Empirical
data supports this conclusion. 84 A paternalistic notion in this con-
text vastly underrates the jurors' ability to weigh the evidence
appropriately, the value and impact of cross-examination, and the
value of the opportunity to present rebuttal experts.
Additionally, concerns about a jury's ability to weigh polygraph
evidence properly apply with equal force to all scientific evidence.
Clearly, the Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate the admission
of some scientific evidence.85 Therefore, it is insufficient to say
that a jury will give too much weight to polygraph evidence merely
because it bears the imprimatur of science. Nor is it enough that
the polygraph evidence relates to a crucial and typically determi-
native matter; that determines only the degree of prejudice, not
whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial. Although concerns
might exist that would support the exclusion of polygraph evidence
as unfairly prejudicial in a particular case, such concerns cannot
support the wholesale exclusion of such evidence. In the sense that
Rule 403 uses the term, there is no reason to conclude that poly-
graph evidence causes unfair prejudice, or that it unduly impresses
the jury, causing them to abdicate their traditional responsibilities.
Most of the criticisms aimed at polygraph evidence, under the guise
of unfair prejudice, apply equally to scientific evidence in general.
3. Waste of Time
The waste of time concern has been expressed convincingly by
courts. 86 There is no doubt that polygraph evidence can consume
a great deal of trial time; in one case, the polygraph evidence
consumed one fourth of an eight day trial.8 7 The most that can be
said about this factor is that Rule 403 requires that it be balanced
against the probative value of the polygraph evidence.
8 See Sevilla, supra note 2, at 17 (citing studies showing that jurors are unlikely to
give polygraph based expert testimony excessive or conclusive weight).
11 See FED. R. EvIm. 702 (setting forth necessary prerequisites for expert witness
testimony, including scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the
trier of fact).
16 See, e.g., Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1541 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part); Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986).
See Brown, 783 F.2d at 1397.
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4. Probative Value
As with the other facets of Rule 403, the probative value of
polygraph evidence varies with the particular facts of a case. In a
rape case where the only other evidence on the issue of consent
consists of the confficting testimony of the victim and the defen-
dant, the probative value of polygraph evidence, to corroborate or
impeach one of them, might be high, especially if both of the
witnesses lack credibility. In contrast, when polygraph testimony
is offered to corroborate one version of conflicting testimony given
by unbiased witnesses, such as bystanders at the scene of an au-
tomobile wreck whose conflicting testimony is more likely the result
of misperception or faulty memory, the probative value is low.
The polygraph test actually does not measure whether or not the
examinee is telling the truth, but only whether or not the examinee
believes that he is telling the truth. In cases of faulty memory or
misperception, the examinee may strongly believe he is truthful,
even though he is not. Thus, the polygraph technique supplies
evidence of low probative value in such a situation. Determination
of the probative value of polygraph evidence requires specific facts.
This concern, like the others encompassed by Rule 403, cannot
support a general exclusionary rule for polygraph evidence.
C. Expert Testimony Regarding Polygraph Examinations-
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 Concerns
Courts express two types of concerns about expert testimony
based on polygraph evidence. The first questions the use of a
polygraph examination as the foundation for an expert opinion.
The second questions not the technique itself, but the appropriate-
ness of expert testimony based on the technique.
1. The Use of a Polygraph Examination as the Foundation for
an Expert Opinion
Perhaps the best way to judge the acceptability of the polygraph
as a basis for expert opinion is to examine the purposes for which
it is used: Is this a technique used only by charlatans, or is there
a credible market that is willing to spend money on the polygraph
technique, based on a belief in its validity? While public acceptance
alone cannot support judicial legitimacy,8 8 the fact that business,
81 Were public acceptance enough, the courts would be required to accept pseudo-
scientific disciplines like astrology, whose public acceptance is evidenced by the appearance
of horoscopes in virtually every major newspaper in the United States.
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the military, the government, and others base important decisions
on the results of polygraph examinations provides some indication
that the polygraph technique serves a legitimate function.
The polygraph has been used extensively in the armed forces
and government. For example, in 1982, the Department of Defense
reported conducting 18,301 polygraph examinations.89 Other agen-
cies of the federal government reported an additional 4,296 poly-
graph examinations." Although the majority of these tests are
conducted for criminal investigations, the CIA and NSC use pol-
ygraph examinations to screen job applicants. 91 For example, the
NSA conducted an estimated 6,700 applicant screening polygraph
examinations in 1982.92 Refusal to take a polygraph may result in
failure to be accepted for employment.93
Use of the polygraph in the private employment context for-
merly accounted for the majority of examinations, ahead of local
criminal investigations and the federal government. 94 Such use be-
came so pervasive that it aroused the interest of Congress, and is
now the subject of legislation. 95 There is no doubt that experts in
employment and in criminal investigations rely on the polygraph
when forming opinions and making decisions. But, in the area of
polygraph evidence, courts are especially prone to look beyond the
practices "of experts and see if there are other reasons to find the
evidence untrustworthy.
Many courts question the trustworthiness of the polygraph
technique as a basis for expert testimony. 96 This concern is not
easily answerable. First, as explained previously, 97 the accuracy of
89 See OTA MEMORANDUM, supra note 37, at app. B 107-08.
90 See id. at 107 (including the FBI, DEA, and BATF).
9' See id. at app. B. 108-09.
See id.
91 See id. at 112.
See id. at 23-24.
91 See Employee Polygraph Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (1988)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988)). Congress became so concerned about the use
of polygraph examinations in the private employment context that it forbade their use in
most situations. It should be noted that the dubious accuracy of the polygraph technique
offers only one of many possible reasons for Congress' action. The fact that the statute
exempts the federal government, local governments, and employers that manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense controlled substances tends to indicate that privacy concerns, not
accuracy worries, motivated Congress.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1989) (calling the
reliability of the polygraph questionable). By reliability, the courts sometimes seem to mean
not the ability consistently to produce the same results, but the ability to produce correct
results. This might more properly be called validity or accuracy.
97 See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
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the polygraph is not susceptible to easy determination and expres-
sion. The most that can be said is that the polygraph technique is
more trustworthy than chance, but has significant error rates. 98
Second, there is some disagreement as to how reliable scientific
evidence must be before gaining admission to the courts. Most
sources indicate, for reasons that are not entirely clear, that the
imprimatur of scientific infallibility calls for a higher standard of
reliability. 99 At least one court, however, believes that
there is no justifiable distinction in principle arising because...
expert testimony may happen to involve newly ascertained or
newly applied scientific principles.' °°
Thus far, no court has been willing to say exactly how reliable the
polygraph technique must be to become admissible. Given all of
these problems in responding to the trustworthiness concern, per-
haps the most that can be done is to repeat the words of Professor
McCormick: "A great deal of lay testimony routinely admitted is
at least as unreliable and inaccurate, and other forms of scientific
evidence involve risks of instrumental or judgmental error."101
Another common objection to the polygraph technique as the
basis for expert testimony relates to the procedures applied in the
administration of the test. Courts state this concern in many dif-
ferent ways, but the crux has been a perception of inadequate
standardization of the procedures for the administration of the
test, and that the test allows too much examiner discretion. 10 2
However, this concern is currently being addressed. Detailed stan-
dards have been developed by experts in the field. 103 State and
national polygraph organizations require members to follow enu-
9 See OTA MEMORANDUM, supra note 37, at 97.
" See, e.g., Miller, 874 F.2d at 1261 (supporting conclusion that polygraph evidence
is generally excluded because of danger that jury will misuse it).
11o State v. Williams, 338 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978) (cited in R. LAWSON, THE KEN-
TUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 12.35, at 429 (2d ed. 1984).
M01 C.T. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 206, at 629.
10 These cases have noted many faults. See, e.g., United States v. Eden, 659 F.2d
1376 (9th Cir. 1981) (control questions not adequate); People v. Adams, 53 Cal App. 3d
109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (lack of proven reliability); People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354,
358 (Colo. 1981) (lack of standards for polygraph examiners); People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d
1070 (II1. 1981) (inadequate examiner standards); State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351, 360 (N.C.
1983) (examiner qualifications critical to admissibility); State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628
(Wis. 1981) (reliability not enough to warrant per se admissibility).
103 See Sevilla, supra note 2, at 19 (citing RAsKiN, BA.AND, & PODLESKY, "VALID=TY
AND RL AmurrY OF DETECTION OF DECEPTioN," (U.S.G.P.O. 1978) Nat'l Institute of Law
Enforcement (LEAA)).
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merated testing standards. °4 Some states have licensing statutes for
polygraph examiners that require compliance with certain stan-
dards. 0 Thus, examiner discretion is being narrowed by and as
increased standardization of procedures is achieved.
2. The Appropriateness of Expert Testimony Based on the
Polygraph Technique
Many of the concerns about expert polygraph testimony are
directed at the appropriateness of such testimony, not at the pol-
ygraph technique itself. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides the
controlling law in this area.'°6 Perhaps the most frequently men-
tioned of these concerns questions examiner competency. 0 7 Given
the importance of the examiner's role, this concern is understand-
able.10 8 The competency of the expert is a specifically enumerated
concern of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'9 Surely, though, this
concern calls for a case-by-case examination, not a per se rule.
The necessary assumption underlying such a rigid exclusionary rule
would be that no person could qualify as an expert in deception
detection.
D. The Due Process and Compulsory Process Clauses: Concerns
Favoring the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence
In contrast to the foregoing concerns, which question the pro-
priety of allowing polygraph evidence, the due process"0 and com-
pulsory process"' clauses of the United States Constitution may,
in some situations, mandate the admission of such evidence. The
first opportunity to address the contemporary meaning of the
compulsory process clause 12 arose in Washington v. Texas.1'3 Then
104 See id.
105 See id. at 19-20.
101 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
"I See, e.g., Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 591.
,08 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
101 Rule 702, supra note 106, requires that the expert witness be qualified by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education.
"' U.S. CoNsT. amend. V and amend. XIV.
.. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
112 See Comment, Compulsory Process and Polygraph Evidence: Does Exclusion Vio-
late a Criminal Defendant's Due Process Rights?, 12 CoNNz. L. REv. 324, 328-29 (1980).
W3 88 U.S. 14 (1967).
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existing Texas statutes barred the defense from introducing the
exculpatory testimony of an accomplice of the defendant. The
Court held that the compulsory process clause provides defendants
with the right to compel the attendance of witnesses and the right
to put those witnesses on the stand. The Court concluded that the
irrebuttable presumption of unreliability erected by the Texas sta-
tutes unconstitutionally contravened the defendant's right to com-
pulsory process.1 1 4
In Chambers v. Mississippi,"5 the Supreme Court recognized
that the right to call witnesses in one's own behalf is essential to
constitutional due process. Leon Chambers was convicted of mur-
dering a policeman in Woodville, Mississippi, during a riot outside
of a bar. Another person, Gable McDonald, admitted responsibility
for the murder three times in private conversations with friends,
and once in a sworn statement to Chambers's counsel. Prior to
trial, however, McDonald repudiated his confession, claiming he
had been persuaded that he would not go to jail for the confession,
and that he would share in the proceeds of a lawsuit that Chambers
would bring against the town of Woodville.116
At trial, Chambers attempted to show that McDonald confessed
to the murder on four separate occasions. Mississippi's rules against
hearsay evidence barred the testimony of those to whom McDonald
confessed. Further, Chambers was unable to evidence the confes-
sions through McDonald, because the state refused to call Mc-
Donald. Because Mississippi followed the antiquated "voucher
rule," which precluded impeachment of a party's own witness,
there existed no opportunity for Chambers to cross-examine
McDonald.'1 7 Justice Powell, writing for the seven-member major-
ity, held "that the exclusion of [the testimony of the witnesses of
the confessions], coupled with the State's refusal to permit Cham-
bers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a trial in accord with
traditional and fundamental standards of due process.l 18
The Court first examined Mississippi's voucher rule. This rule
not only prevented Chambers from cross-examining McDonald,
", See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20-23 (1967); see also Comment, supra note
112, at 328-31 (discussing Washington v. Texas and its impact on the compulsory process
clause).
11 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
116 See id. at 285-90 (1973).
See id. at 291-94.
"' Id. at 302.
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but its corollary, that the party calling a witness is bound by
anything the witness might say, imposed practical restrictions on
the scope of direct examination."19 The Court stated, "[T]he right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in
one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due
process."' 120 It acknowledged that the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses could bow to other legitimate interests in the
criminal trial process. Upon examination of the legitimate interests
served by the voucher rule, the Court found that "it bears little
present relationship to the realities of the criminal process."''
The Court next examined the trial court's refusal to permit
Chambers to call the witnesses of McDonald's confessions. It first
noted that hearsay statements are generally untrustworthy because
"they lack the traditional indicia of reliability: they are usually not
made under oath or similar circumstances that impress the speaker
with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not
subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in order that
his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury."' 22 The
Court then noted that exceptions to the rule against hearsay evi-
dence have developed when there are circumstances tending to
assure reliability, compensating for the lack of an oath or an
opportunity for cross-examination, most notably in the case of
declarations against interest.'2 This is because one is unlikely to
fabricate a statement adverse to his own interest at the time it is
made. At this time, Mississippi recognized only declarations against
pecuniary interest, not those against penal interest. 24 The Court
noted that although there were sometimes reasons to suspect state-
ments against penal interest, there were ample indicia of reliability
here: McDonald's confessions were spontaneous, made to close
acquaintances shortly after the murder; each was corroborated by
other evidence in the case; each confession was self-incriminating
and clearly against interest; and finally, McDonald was present in
the courtroom-he was under oath, he could be cross-examined,
and his demeanor and responses could be viewed by the jury.' 25
The Court stated, "Few rights are more fundamental than that of
" See id. at 294-98.
110 Id. at 294.
"I Id. at 296.
'1 Id. at 298.
'1 See id. at 298-99; see also FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3).
124 See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299.
'5 Id. at 300-02.
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an accused to present witnesses in his own defense,' 126 and that,
given these persuasive indicia of trustworthiness, the state could
not bar the admission of this evidence as hearsay. 127
In the succeeding years, a number of commentators indicated
their belief that Chambers could be read to require the admission
of polygraph evidence, where a proper foundation demonstrated
the reliability of the evidence, and the evidence was critical to the
case. 28 These arguments found support in State v. Dorsey,129 where
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that state's prior approach
to polygraph evidence, which required a stipulation or the absence
of an objection at trial, "[i]nconsistent with the concept of due
process.' ' 30 The argument states that when polygraph evidence is
critical to the defendant's case, and adequate indicia of trustwor-
thiness can be shown, admissibility may be mandated by the due
process clause as construed in Chambers.
Even more recently, the Supreme Court accepted a similar line
of reasoning in a case involving hypnotically refreshed testimony.
In Rock v. Arkansas,3' Vickie Rock had been convicted of man-
slaughter for the killing of her husband. The killing occurred during
the course of a fight between Rock and her husband. Rock was
unable to recall the precise details of the shooting, so her attorney
had her hypnotized by a licensed neuropsychologist. After the
hypnosis sessions, Rock remembered that her finger had not been
on the trigger of the gun at the time of the shooting and that the
gun had discharged when her husband grabbed her arm. These
statements caused Rock's counsel to obtain a gun expert, who
determined that the gun was prone to fire when hit or dropped,
without pulling the trigger.13 2
The trial court refused to admit hypnotically-refreshed testi-
mony, limiting Rock's testimony to those matters that she remem-
bered and stated to the examiner prior to being placed under
hypnosis. The Supreme Court held that the Arkansas evidentiary
'" Id. at 302.
'' Id.
"2S See, e.g., Note, Admission of Polygraph Results: A Due Process Perspective, 55
IND. L.J. 157, 189-90 (1980); Comment, supra note 112, at 334.
-- 539 P.2d 204 (N.M. 1975); see also Tafoya v. Baca, 702 P.2d 1001 (N.M. 1985)
(arguing that Chambers may require admission of polygraph evidence when critical to the
defense).
11o State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204, 205 (N.M. 1975).
131 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
"3 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 45-47 (1987).
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rule categorically prohibiting the admission of hypnotically-re-
freshed testimony did not pass constitutional muster. The Court
examined some of the criticisms of the reliability of hypnotically-
refreshed testimony. 13 3 It then pointed out that cross-examination
may be used to reveal inconsistencies, and that expert testimony
and cautionary instructions may be utilized to help the jury give
appropriate weight to hypnotically-refreshed testimony. 3 4 It further
held that the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments include a right to offer testimony. 135 Also the compulsory
process clause of the sixth amendment was held to command that
a defendant be allowed "to call witnesses whose testimony is
'material and favorable to his defense. '136 In the face of these
and other concerns of constitutional stature, the Court concluded,
"A State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does
not extend to per se exclusions [of evidence] that may be reliable
in an individual case."' 37 It should be noted that Rock involved
"a criminal defendant's right to testify.' 13 The opinion contains
some indidation that a less rigorous analysis might apply where the
exclusionary rule applies only to the testimony of witnesses who
are not criminal defendants.139
Chambers and Rock demonstrate that the Court applies a
balancing test when examining the constitutionality of exclusionary
rules of evidence. On one side are the due process and compulsory
process clauses, both of which have been held to include a fun-
damental right to offer favorable testimony. On the other side is
the state's legitimate interest in excluding untrustworthy evidence.
When these sides conflict, the Court undertakes a "close exami-
nation" of the balance struck. This examination placed the burden
of justifying the evidentiary exclusion on the state in both Cham-
bers and Rock.140
-3' See id. at 58-61. It should be noted that, although this case is only three years old,
its precedential value is uncertain. The majority of five was composed of Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall, respec-
tively, have since been replaced by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. If any of the
new Justices found the arguments of the dissenters, Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor,
and Scalia, more convincing, the same case would reach the opposite result.
14 See id. at 61.
" See id. at 49-53.
136 Id. at 52 (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
137 Id. at 61.
M See id. at 53.
See id. at 58 n.15.
146 See id. at 61.
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Although this author has been unable to locate any studies
comparing the reliability of hypnotically-refreshed testimony with
that of polygraph testimony, given the Court's criticism of the
reliability of hypnotically-refreshed testimony,1 41 it is difficult to
believe that such testimony is significantly more reliable than pol-
ygraph testimony. Thus it might be argued by analogy to the Rock
case that, in the proper circumstances, the due process and com-
pulsory process clauses bar a state's application of an absolute
exclusionary rule to polygraph testimony. The Court noted in both
Rock and Chambers that the contested evidence was corroborated
by other evidence. Therefore, the Constitution is more likely to
prohibit the exclusion of polygraph evidence when it is corrobo-
rated by other evidence. Additionally, the Chambers court empha-
sized that the rejected evidence "was critical to Chambers's
defense. ' 1 42 From this statement one may infer that the admission
of polygraph evidence is more likely to be required by the Consti-
tution when it is crucial to the defense, in the sense that the
defendant will be otherwise unable to provide credible evidence of
an important fact.
Consider again a hypothetical rape case where the only evidence
on the consent issue consists of the conflicting testimony of the
defendant and the victim. The jury is unlikely to give the defen-
dant's testimony a great deal of weight, as he has a substantial
penal interest in the outcome of the case. In such a case, the Court
might find that exculpatory polygraph evidence is crucial to the
defense, and therefore that the due process and compulsory process
clauses require its admission.
Finally, as the Rock Court's analysis demonstrates,1 43 concerns
that may apply in most cases cannot justify a rule of per se
inadmissibility, given the constraints imposed by the due process
and compulsory process clauses. Per se exclusionary rules face close
scrutiny by the Court, and a state must show the unreliability that
justifies the rule. Rock gives even more support to the argument
that categorical rules barring the admissibility of polygraph evi-
dence may violate the Constitution.
Given this analysis of the merits of the concerns about poly-
graph evidence, the next logical step involves an examination of
141 See id. at 56-61.
142 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
141 See Rock, 483 U.S. at 61-62 (characterizing wholesale inadmissibility of post-
hypnotic testimony as an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify).
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courts' responses to offers of polygraph evidence in light of the
foregoing concerns. The next section of this Note undertakes such
an examination, analyzing the various approaches adopted by courts
in the federal system.
III. THE FEDERAL COuRTs' APPROACHES TO POLYGRAPH
EVIDENCE
At least five distinct approaches to polygraph evidence exist in
the federal system. Each approach is subsequently examined and
analyzed.
A. Per Se Inadmissibility
In 1923, the D.C. Circuit, in Frye v. United States,144 became
the first federal appellate court to decide that expert testimony
based on a precursor of the modern polygraph technique should
be inadmissible in all circumstances. The defendant had been con-
victed of murder in the second degree. During the trial, he had
offered the testimony of an expert who had applied a systolic
blood pressure deception test to the defendant. The trial court
refused to admit the expert testimony, and the D.C. Circuit af-
firmed its decision. 145
This decision was followed by an overwhelming majority of
the nation's courts for the next fifty years, 146 and still commands
a significant federal and state following. 147 Its approach has some
value. First, it creates an easy rule for lower courts to apply. This
notion may be called the "administrative convenience" rationale.
Similarly, this approach eliminates the need for case-by-case deter-
minations on those objections to polygraph evidence whose validity
turns on the facts of each particular situation. By excluding the
evidence in all cases, the need for examination of examiner com-
petency and probative value in light of potential for unfair preju-
dice, waste of time, and confusion of the issues is also eliminated.
-- 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14 See Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14. Subsequently, some controversy has developed about
Frye's guilt or innocence. Some commentators maintain that, years after Frye's conviction,
another person confessed to the murder. See C.T. McCoRMICK, supra note 14, at 606 n.5
(citing Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv.
711, 715 (1953)). Other sources claim that this is fanciful mythology, and that Frye was
guilty. See Sevilla, supra note 2, at 7 n.3.
'4 See Sevilla, supra note 2, at 7-8.
147 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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In fact, by categorically excluding polygraph evidence, this position
avoids all of the potential concerns raised under Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 and 702.
These benefits, however, provide insufficient justification. The
administrative convenience notion can have little weight against an
offer of relevant polygraph evidence when liberty and perhaps life
are at stake. The elimination of the need for a case-by-case inquiry
into certain objections bears the same criticism. Indeed, these ar-
guments would equally well support a per se rule of admissibility.
The notion supports only the avoidance of the inquiry. It is out-
come neutral, favoring per se admissibility and per se inadmissi-
bility equally. To the extent that other factors favor an exclusionary
approach, however, this factor adds weight to the rule of per se
inadmissibility.
The problem with per se exclusion is that it completely ignores
the fact that most of the arguments for the exclusion of polygraph
testimony are fact specific concerns. Additionally, this approach is
difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's holdings in Cham-
bers and Rock. Unless one is prepared to accept the proposition
that polygraph evidence is somehow significantly less reliable than
hypnotically-refreshed testimony, any constitutionally acceptable
approach to polygraph evidence must be reconcilable with the due
process and compulsory process clauses, as explained in Chambers
and Rock.
The per se exclusion of polygraph evidence is an unsound
approach. Although it may be administratively convenient, the
convenience is gained only by the sacrifice of constitutionally man-
dated rights to offer material and favorable evidence. As the Su-
preme Court indicated in Rock, the legitimate interest in barring
unreliable evidence cannot justify such a wholesale sacrifice.
B. Admissible by Prior Stipulation
A significant number of jurisdictions apply the rule of per se
inadmissibility to polygraph evidence, with an exception that allows
the trial court discretion to admit the evidence if the parties stip-
ulate to the admissibility, scope, and use of the results prior to the
administration of the examination.' 4 Some of these jurisdictions
enforce additional requirements. 49
1' See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
"41 See C.T. McCoRNBCK, supra note 14, at 629 & n.45.
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United States v. Oliver 50 provides a representative example of
this approach. In that case, the defendant was accused of interstate
transportation of a woman for sexual gratification. 151 The defen-
dant claimed that the sex acts were consensual. 5 2 He offered to
submit to a polygraph test and agreed that the results would be
admissible even if unfavorable to him. The defendant had taken a
polygraph test previously, without a stipulation from the prosecu-
tion, the results of which indicated that his consent claim was
truthful.1 53
The stipulated polygraph examination indicated that the defen-
dant was deceptive. Naturally, when the unfavorable results were
admitted at trial, and the defendant's offer of expert testimony
regarding the previous, unstipulated polygraph test that indicated
his truthfulness was rejected, he claimed that his rights were vio-
lated. Specifically, the indigent defendant claimed that the court
would not have authorized the expenditure of public funds for the
stipulated polygraph test unless he agreed to the stipulation. The
appellate court held that the defendant had made a knowing waiver
of his right against self-incrimination, and that the trial court
correctly admitted the stipulated test results and correctly excluded
the unstipulated test results. 154
Although one might think that this approach does nothing to
assure that the polygraph testimony is trustworthy, this would be
a superficial view. By requiring that both sides stipulate to its
admissibility prior to the administration of the polygraph exami-
nation, this position gives the interested parties incentive to assure
that the evidence is trustworthy. This approach assures the selection
of a qualified, fair examiner. If an examiner is not impartial, he
will become known as a "defense" or "prosecution" expert, and
the opposition will never be willing to stipulate to tests administered
by him.
This treatment avoids some confusion of the issues. Consider
the Oliver case, which is described above. When the unfavorable,
stipulated polygraph evidence was presented, the defendant at-
tempted to sow confusion through an offer of favorable, but
"5 525 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 973 (1976).
"' See United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 973 (1976) (Specifically, the defendant was indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201
(1972).).
-2 See id.
151 See id. at 734.
,54 See id. at 734-38.
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unstipulated, polygraph evidence. But, because the opposition had
not stipulated to this evidence, the court was able to exclude it and
avoid confusion of the issues.
Another benefit of this approach is that it weakens any argu-
ments that might be made at trial by the party whose case is
damaged by the polygraph evidence. Once a party has stipulated
that polygraph testimony should be admissible regardless of the
results of the examination, he is likely to find that any arguments
later made regarding the unreliability or unfairly prejudicial effects
of such evidence will fall on justifiably deaf judicial ears. His
stipulation effectively indicates that he has none of these objec-
tions. This is consistent with the general requirement of evidence
law that there be an objection in order to preserve a question for
appeal, in the absence of plain error. 155 There is no reason that a
party should not be able to waive, in advance, a limited group of
objections to a specific type of evidence. That is precisely the effect
of the stipulation.
There are problems with the stipulation approach. The first is
that a stipulation in no way categorically affects the evidence; all
of the previously discussed concerns' 56 still apply. One might ask
why the court system should be concerned where the parties are
not. This argument has some merit in the limited context of pol-
ygraph evidence. But what would a court do when faced with a
stipulation to the admissibility of testimony by an expert astrolo-
gist? How about a stipulation to the admissibility of testimony by
an expert psychic, who offers to communicate with a murder victim
to identify the murderer in court? Such logical extension leads to
the same sort of inquiry that brought courts to the stipulation
approach: How reliable must evidence be to qualify for admission?
Additionally, the constitutional infirmities raised by Chambers
v. Mississippi and Rock v. Arkansas157 are not cured by stipulation.
If a party has a constitutional right to offer this sort of testimony,
there is no justification that will support limiting that right to
situations where the prosecutor will stipulate admissibility. If the
right exists, it exists in all cases.
Thus, it is clear that, although the stipulation approach has
some appeal, its merits are limited. The approach creates a whole
new evidentiary question similar to the one it was designed to
"I See FED. R. EvrD. 103(a)(1), (d).
' See supra notes 70-143 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra notes 115-43 and accompanying text.
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answer: How reliable must evidence be to qualify for the stipulation
treatment? Additionally, it faces the same constitutional concerns
raised by the rule of per se inadmissibility.
C. Admissible Based on Special Circumstances
There is a line of cases that is sometimes cited as allowing
limited use of polygraph evidence in special circumstances.' 58 The
common thread that binds these cases relates to the limited way in
which they allow polygraph evidence to be used. The polygraph
evidence is admitted not to show the truthfulness of the defendant
or witness, but because the fact that a polygraph test was admin-
istered has some relevance. This can best be explained by an
example.
In Tyler v. United States, s9 the D.C. Circuit allowed the limited
use of polygraph evidence.1 60 Tyler was accused of first degree
murder.161 During their investigation of this murder, the police
arrested Tyler for a different crime, but questioned him concerning
the murder. 62 When he denied involvement, the police suggested
that Tyler take a lie detector test, and he consented. After the
examiner informed Tyler that the test indicated that he was lying,
Tyler confessed to the murder.1 61
At trial, Tyler claimed that his confession was coerced.164 When
the prosecution offered the polygraph evidence, Tyler's counsel
moved to strike it. The trial court admitted the polygraph evidence,
instructing the jury that "[t]he statement of the [polygraph exam-
iner] that he told the defendant that the machine indicated he was
lying was not admitted as evidence of any alleged lying of the
defendant, but merely as evidence bearing upon the question whether
the confession was, in fact, voluntary.' '65
"I See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1533-34 (lth Cir. 1989) (citing
United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1989)).
,51 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952). Interestingly, this
example, one of the earliest, came from the same court that promulgated the Frye Rule of
per se inadmissibility. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding
evidence based on a forerunner of the modem polygraph inadmissible for lack of general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belonged).
160 Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
908 (1952).
M See Tyler, 193 F.2d at 25.
162 See id.
63 Id. at 26.
'14 Id. at 27-28.
161 Id. at 31.
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Although the effectiveness of such a limiting jury instruction
is arguable,'6 the Federal Rules of Evidence approve of the practice
in some circumstances. 167 Assuming that such a limiting instruction
to the jury is effective, this approach is really not related to the
acceptability of polygraph-based testimony. In the Tyler case, and
in all others applying this exception, the objective reliability of the
polygraph is irrelevant. The defendant's subjective perception of
the reliability of the polygraph is what matters. For this reason,
the exception could apply just as well to a Ouija board, if the
defendant could be shown subjectively to believe that it was relia-
ble. Since the subject of this Note, courts' approaches to polygraph
evidence, has only a collateral relationship with the underlying
subject of the Tyler line of cases, which is the admissibility of
circumstances surrounding an admission or confession, no further
analysis will be offered here. It might be noted, however, that in
one aspect the Tyler approach is similar to the approach to poly-
graph evidence discussed next in this Note, and to the stipulation
approach. Under the stipulation approach, the defendant may
choose to prevent the introduction of polygraph evidence by refus-
ing to make the required stipulation. Similarly, in Tyler, the de-
fendant could have prevented the introduction of the polygraph
evidence by not contesting the voluntariness of his confession.
Although this left Tyler with a difficult choice, under different
circumstances the defendant might feel that the admission of the
polygraph evidence would be more damaging than the loss of the
ability to contest the voluntariness of a confession or admission.
The choice is made available to the defendant.
These approaches all seem to attempt to maximize the residual
utility of the party against whom the polygraph evidence is being
offered. The next approach discussed in this Note, that adopted
by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Piccinonna,168 is similar
in that it affords a defendant some opportunity to prevent the
admission of some polygraph evidence, but at a cost. 169
'6 The words of one commentator discussing character evidence are equally appropriate
here: "It appears certain that when the law requests jurors to give character evidence a
restricted use, it demands 'a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only the jury's power,
but anybody else's."' Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Inter-
minable Problem, 50 NoTRE DAm LAw. 758, 774 (1975) (quoting Nash v. United States,
54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)).
"67 See FED. R. Evm. 105 and advisory committee's note.
16S 885 F.2d 1529.
,61 See infra notes 170-221 and accompanying text.
1990-91]
KENTUCyKY LAW JOURNAL
D. Admissible for Impeachment or Corroboration
A fairly new approach allows the admission of polygraph evi-
dence for the impeachment or corroboration of the testimony of a
witness at trial. This theory does not allow the use of polygraph
evidence as independent evidence of the innocence or guilt of the
defendant.
1. The Massachusetts Experiment: Commonwealth v. Vitello
The corroboration or impeachment approach to polygraph ev-
idence admissibility apparently originated in the Massachusetts de-
cision, Commonwealth v. Vitello.' 70 Vitello had been convicted of
armed robbery.' 7' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial because the trial
court admitted polygraph evidence as part of the prosecution's case
in chief. 72 Explaining an earlier decision Tegarding polygraph evi-
dence, 73 the court stated that neither exculpatory nor inculpatory
polygraph evidence could be introduced as part of either side's
case in chief, but it could be used to impeach or corroborate the
defendant's testimony.' 74
The Vitello court cited many of the same reasons for barring
the use of polygraph evidence, as independent evidence, as those
discussed previously in this Note. 75 The court's analysis required
a balancing of the probative value of polygraph evidence against
its "policy 'costs,' or probable dangers.' ' 76 The costs include jury
confusion and prejudice, intrusion into the jury function, and the
waste of trial resources. The court stated that the probative value
of polygraph evidence on the question of guilt was limited because
"the examiner's ultimate conclusion regarding truth or deception
depends to a considerable extent on the examiner's subjective per-
-1- 381 N.E.2d 582 (Mass. 1978).
171 Id. at 584.
7 See id. at 601.
M The court admitted that its prior decisions on the admissibility of polygraph evidence
were susceptible to multiple and conflicting interpretations. See id. at 585-86 (explaining
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974), by stating, "It is thus
understandable that one trial judge, relying on A Juvenile, could conclude that favorable
polygraph evidence is admissible only to corroborate the defendant's testimony .... while
another trial judge could conclude in this case that unfavorable polygraph evidence is
admissible as part of the Commonwealth's case in chief.").
,74 See id. at 596-99.
'7 Compare id. at 596-97 with supra notes 70-109 and accompanying text.
.76 Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 596.
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ceptions and intuitions regarding the subject as well as the subject's
perceptions of the examiner, the machine, and the test situation."
1 77
The interesting portion of the Vitello opinion contains the
justifications offered for admitting polygraph evidence for the
impeachment or corroboration of a defendant. Initially, the court
noted that the experience gained through such limited use of pol-
ygraph evidence could lead to the alleviation of many of the
problems associated with such evidence. The court apparently be-
lieved that limits on the use of the evidence also limit the potential
for mischief, while affording courts an opportunity to learn how
to solve problems connected with the evidence.
The court next stated that such limited use is analogous, though
imperfectly, to character evidence used to impeach a witness's
reputation for truthfulness or to rehabilitate a witness whose rep-
utation has been attacked. The court went so far as to describe
the polygraph examiner as an "expert character witness. 178 It did,
however, identify two points of departure from the analogy to
character evidence. First, character for untruthfulness cannot be
proved by evidence of particular acts of lying, or by private opin-
ion: "In contrast, the polygraph examiner testifies as to his per-
sonal opinion based on the specific acts that he observed and that
the polygraph machine recorded during the examination.' ' 79 Sec-
ond, a witness's credibility generally may not be supported with
corroborating evidence until the witness's credibility suffers an
attack. The court deemed this rule inapplicable to polygraph evi-
dence that corroborates a defendant's testimony. 80 The court also
raised the notion of defendant choice, noting that a defendant that
otherwise would not testify because of vulnerability to impeach-
ment by a past criminal record, might choose to testify in light of
favorable polygraph evidence with which to counter that impeach-
ment. The court stated that polygraph evidence is arguably a more
direct and accurate means of judging credibility than evidence of
past criminal behavior.' 81 This is consistent with modern legal and
psychological thought, both of which question the use of criminal
convictions for impeachment purposes. 8 2 The conclusion that evi-
I77 Id.
178 Id. at 597-98.
M Id. at 598 n.25.
See id.
See id. at 597-99.
8 See Lawson, supra note 166. In his article, Professor Lawson compares the fun-
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dence of prior criminal behavior should damage the credibility of
a witness requires an inference that persons with prior criminal
behavior have a personality trait for untruthfulness. This inference
is unsupportable. In fact, "dishonesty and falsehood .. .tend to
be 'unintegrated, unstable and unpredictable.' In short 'no one is
honest or dishonest by "nature"; honesty is simply a name used
to describe conduct as observed in specific situations.' ' 183 Although
polygraph evidence suffers some criticisms regarding its accuracy,
it does not require the sort of specious, unsupportable inference
that justifies the use of prior criminal behavior to attack credibility.
Finally, the court believed that the admission of polygraph
testimony would encourage defendants to testify, thereby enhancing
the trial court's ability to ferret out the truth and fostering the
perception of fairness. If the polygraph examination incorrectly
indicated deceptiveness, the defendant could preclude the introduc-
tion of the evidence by forgoing his right to testify. The court
found this scenario the optimal solution to the competing policy
considerations. 184
2. United States v. Piccinonna: The Eleventh Circuit Adopts the
Impeachment or Corroboration Approach
In United States v. Piccinonna, the Eleventh Circuit adopted
the impeachment or corroboration approach to polygraph evidence,
with some modifications to the Massachusetts version. An expla-
nation of the case, which will aid in understanding the theory,
follows.
Piccinonna, a waste disposal businessman, stood accused of
lying to a grand jury during an antitrust investigation. Prior to
trial, he asked the government to stipulate to the admissibility of
the results of a polygraph test to be administered subsequently.
damental assumptions regarding personality that underlie the law of character evidence to
the empirically supported scientific appraisals of personality offered by psychologists. This
comparison reveals that many of the assumptions underlying the law of character evidence,
especially regarding the use of prior criminal behavior, are naive, misleading, and indefen-
sible. See id. at 787-88.
"I Id. at 785 (quoting H. EYSENCK, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 9 (1964); H. HARTSHORNE,
CHARACTER IN HUMAN RELATIONS (1932); H. HARTSHORNE & M. MAY, 1 STUDIES IN THE
NATURE OF CiARACTER-STuDrEs IN DECEIT (1928)).
I- See Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 598.
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The government refused. Piccinonna procured polygraph evidence
anyway, which was favorable and which he offered at trial. The
trial court believed it was bound to exclude the evidence by the
Eleventh Circuit's prior rule of per se inadmissibility. Piccinonna
was convicted. 185
On appeal, Piccinonna urged modification of the per se rule.
The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated his conviction and
remanded the case. The appellate court adopted both the stipula-
tion approach and the impeachment or corroboration approach.
186
The court imposed three conditions on the impeachment or cor-
roboration exception: 1) the offering party must provide the op-
position with adequate notice of its plans to offer polygraph
evidence; 2) the opposition must be afforded reasonable opportu-
nity to administer its own test; and 3) the pertinent Federal Rules
of Evidence governing impeachment or corroboration apply. Fi-
nally, the court stated that the trial judge would retain discretion
to exclude the evidence entirely. 187
Like the Vitello court, the Piccinonna court analogized the
impeachment or corroboration use of polygraph evidence to im-
peachment or corroboration by evidence of truthful or untruthful
character. This analogy, however, highlights some differences be-
tween the Vitello and Piccinonna versions of the impeachment or
corroboration approach. First, Vitello was limited to the impeach-
ment or corroboration of the testimony of the defendant. 8 8 The
Piccinonna court broadened the approach to include the impeach-
ment or corroboration of any witness at trial. 89
See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1530-31.
See id. at 1536-37.
18 See id.
187 See Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 597-99. In later cases, Massachusetts's high court ex-
pressly barred polygraph evidence to impeach or corroborate the testimony of any witness
other than a criminal defendant:
Although polygraph evidence may be used for the limited purposes of im-
peaching or corroborating a criminal defendant's testimony, "[a]t this stage
of the development of polygraph examinations, we ... decline to extend the
principles of the Vitello case beyond the defendant to other witnesses, at least
in the absence of an appropriate stipulation (and even then we reserve judg-
ment on the issue)."
Commonwealth v. Fuller, 475 N.E.2d 381, 387 (Mass. 1985) (citation omitted) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Dilego, 439 N.E.2d 807 (Mass. 1982)); see also Commonwealth v. Walker,
466 N.E.2d 71 (Mass. 1984) (holding that, even where witness, defendant, and the Com-
monwealth all sign a stipulation, polygraph test results for nonparty witnesses are inadmis-
sible).
"19 See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536.
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There is at least one other distinction between the Vitello and
Piccinonna approaches. The Piccinonna court specifically stated,
"[T]he polygraph administrator's testimony will be governed by
the Federal Rules of Evidence for the admissibility of corroboration
or impeachment testimony."1 90 Thus, the court went on to state,
"[E]vidence that a witness passed a polygraph examination, used
to corroborate that witness's in-court testimony, would not be
admissible under Rule 608 unless or until the credibility of that
witness [was] first attacked."1 91 The Vitello court explicitly disa-
greed. After stating that the impeachment or corroboration use of
polygraph evidence is roughly analogous to the impeachment of a
witness's credibility by attacking his reputation for truthfulness,
the court raised two points of departure. 92 The first, the rule that
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness must be presented in
the form of the witness's general reputation among those who
know him, and cannot be proved by particular acts, is discussed
below in this Note. 93 The second point of departure, however,
turns on the rule that prohibits corroboration of the credibility of
a witness prior to an attack upon that witness's credibility. The
Vitello court, in contrast to the Piccinonna court, stated, "We do
190 Id.
191 Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 608, which governs the admission of opinion and
reputation of character, provides:
(A) OPMON AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER. The credibility of a witness
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject
to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character
of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise.
(B) SPECIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Specific instances of the conduct of
the witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of a crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-exami-
nation of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined
has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness,
does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to
credibility.
192 See Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 598 & n.25.
193 See infra notes 203-21 and accompanying text.
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not think that this rule should be applied to the admission of
polygraph evidence to corroborate the defendant's testimony." 194
3. Vitello's Progeny: The Massachusetts Experiment Fails
Although the Piccinonna opinion makes no mention of Vitello,
the similarity of the two approaches makes it likely that Vitello
had some influence on the Piccinonna court. This is ironic, because
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overruled Vitello less
than three months after the Eleventh Circuit decided Piccinonna.195
In Commonwealth v. Mendes, 96 the Massachusetts court charac-
terized Vitello as 'a cautious first step' in the hope, if not expec-
tation, that the development of polygraph testing would soon reach
the stage where it would be generally accepted by the appropriate
scientific community.' 1 97 The court then explained that its hopes
and expectations had been disappointed in the fifteen years since
Vitello. First, it asserted that neither polygraph theory nor practice
had changed appreciably since Vitello. 198 There remained no con-
sensus among the experts as to the accuracy of the polygraph
technique, 199 and no court, except perhaps the Eleventh Circuit in
Piccinonna, could conclude that the test had gained general accep-
tance among the relevant scientific experts. 2° The court articulated
a shopping list of generic objections to polygraph evidence: 20 it is
subjective and dependent on the competence, experience, and ed-
ucation of the examiner; its admission likely leads to a battle of
the experts over its probative value, and confuses the issues; it is
likely to have a prejudicial impact and usurp the role of the jury;
and, judges must suffer the burden required to assure that experts
are properly qualified and examinations are properly administered.
Finally, the court held that the intervening fifteen years of exami-
nation and evaluation, since Vitello, failed to justify the admission
"1 Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 598 & n.25.
"94 Piccinonna was decided on September 28, 1989. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court overruled Vitello on December 11, 1989. See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d
35 (Mass. 1989).
"16 547 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989).
" Id. at 41 (citing Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120).
"4 See id. at 38.
"4 Id. at 39 (citing articles that place polygraph accuracy as high as 97% and as low
as 84% for detecting guilties and as high as 92% and as low as 53% for detecting innocents).
See id. at 39.
See id. at 41.
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of polygraph evidence. The court returned to a rule of per se
inadmissibility. 20 2
The most unfortunate result from Mendes's termination of the
Vitello experiment is the indication that the experiment failed to
shed any new light on the knotty problems consistently associated
with polygraph evidence. After fifteen years of experimentation,
the Mendes court offered the same stale reasons for returning to
a rule of per se inadmissibility that courts have offered since Frye
v. United States. The kernels of enlightenment optimistically planted
by the Vitello court yielded nothing during Mendes's harvest.
4. Piccinonna's Progeny: The Sound and the Fury203
Although the decision is only seventeen months old as of this
writing, Piccinonna's significance and meaning are already the
subject of extensive discussion in several cases and at least one
article. 2 4 The first discussion occurred in the opinion of the district
court to which the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case, United
States v. Piccinonna205 [hereinafter Piccinonna I]. The district
court once again held Piccinonna's polygraph evidence inadmissi-
ble. The court first declared the evidence irrelevant, and insuffi-
ciently probative to outweigh its potential for prejudice. The court
went on to state its doubt that polygraph evidence could ever gain
admission. The court first called the stipulation exception, ap-
proved in Piccinonna, pointless because no one would stipulate to
the admissibility of unfavorable polygraph evidence .2° This state-
ment ignores the requirement that such stipulation occur prior to
the administration of the polygraph examination. 2 7 The court then
stated that Rule 608(b) would prohibit introduction as a specific
instance of conduct reflecting the defendant's credibility. It then
claimed that, because Rule 608(a) limits impeachment or corrobo-
ration of a witness's credibility to character for truthfulness or
See id. at 40-41.
10 "[I]t is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 5, sc. 5, lines 26-28.
- See Elortegui v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Fla. 1990); United States v.
Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (same case on remand) [hereinafter Picci-
nonna 11]; United States v. Pope, 30 M.J. 1188 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990); Jung, Polygraph
Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials After United States v. Piccinonna, 64 FLA. B.J. 49
(February 1990).
215 729 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
See id. at 1337.
Cf. Jung, supra note 204, at 50.
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untruthfulness, polygraph evidence could never gain admission,
arguing that a single polygraph examination could never form an
adequate foundation upon which an expert could base an opinion
of the defendant's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 20 8
The second case to discuss the Eleventh Circuit's Piccinonna
decision, Elortegui v. United States,20 9 agreed with the Piccinonna
11 court's conclusion that polygraph evidence is categorically in-
admissible under Rule 608(a). It stated, however, that polygraph
evidence might come in under an exception to Rule 608(b). The
exception cited by the Elortegui court follows Rule 608(b), except
"that 'extrinsic evidence which contradicts the material testimony
of a prior witness is admissible.' ' 210 This theory seems plainly
incorrect; unless it is the practice of the courts of southern Florida
to admit immaterial evidence, this so-called exception emasculates
Rule 608(b).
Both of these cases misconstrue Piccinonna. Polygraph evi-
dence offers many diverse opportunities to corroborate or impeach
the testimony of a witness at trial. The Elortegui and Piccinonna
11 courts incorrectly read the character evidence analogy as limiting
the impeachment or corroboration use of polygraph evidence to
character for truthfulness. The analogy only explains how the
court's approach to polygraph evidence works; the court did not
intend for the analogy to impose limits on the use of polygraph
evidence. The court intended only to illustrate the point that a
defendant could avoid impeachment with unfavorable polygraph
evidence by not offering impeachable testimony, just as an accused
can avoid impeachment with unfavorable general character evi-
dence by not offering favorable character evidence.
As for polygraph evidence of the particular character trait for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, the Vitello court expressly stated
what must necessarily be read as implicit in the Piccinonna opinion:
as a matter of law, one polygraph test may be a sufficient foun-
dation to form the basis of an expert opinion as to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. 21' The Piccinonna court said,
"[E]vidence that a witness passed a polygraph examination, used
See Piccinonna II, 729 F. Supp. at 1336-38.
21 743 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
210 Id. at 830 n.3 (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Calle, 822 F.2d 1016,
1021 (1lth Cir. 1987)).
211 See Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 598 ("Indeed, we think it accurate ... to describe an
examiner as a potential 'expert character witness."').
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to corroborate that witness's in-court testimony, would not be
admissible under Rule 608 unless or until the credibility of that
witness [was] first attacked. '212 Implicit in this statement is that,
once the credibility of that witness is attacked, evidence that the
witness passed a polygraph examination might be admissible. A
further necessary implication is that, as a matter of law, a poly-
graph test might form a sufficient foundation for the basis of an
expert opinion as to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
5. An Analysis of the Impeachment or Corroboration Approach
The. Piccinonna opinion offered little indication of why the
Eleventh Circuit chose the impeachment or corroboration ap-
proach. The Vitello opinion, however, provides some useful anal-
ysis. The Vitello court stated, "[D]espite the doubts that we harbour
regarding the reliability of the polygraph method, it is arguably a
more direct, and more accurate, means of aiding the jury in judging
the credibility of a witness than is the introduction of past criminal
behavior. '21 3 Given the inconsistency of the inference required to
conclude that past criminal behavior indicates a character trait for
dishonesty, with empirically supported modern psychological
thought,24 it is clear that the polygraph technique is both more
direct and more accurate.
The corroboration or impeachment approach makes some steps
toward a reconciliation with the valid concerns courts have ex-
pressed about polygraph evidence. 215 Particularly, the Vitelto ap-
proach, which limits the use of polygraph evidence to impeachment
or corroboration of defendants, strikes a justifiable balance among
the probativeness of the evidence and the potential for waste of
time and confusion of the issues. Because there is usually only one
defendant, the potential waste of time or confusion of the issues
is limited. Conversely, because the polygraph evidence will impeach
or corroborate the testimony of only the defendant, its probative
value is likely to be higher. It should-be noted that the Piccinonna
opinion did not limit the impeachment or corroboration use of
polygraph evidence to defendants. The balance struck by the Pic-
cinonna court implicitly places even more weight on the probative-
212 Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536.
211 Vitello, 381 N.E.2d at 598.
214 See Lawson, supra note 166.
215 See supra notes 70-109 and accompanying text.
[VoL. 80
POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
ness of polygraph evidence, and less on the waste of time and
confusion of the issues concerns. But the Piccinonna court carefully
noted that the trial judge retains discretion to exclude the evi-
dence. 216
Additionally, this approach may satisfy some of the concerns
raised earlier in this Note in the discussion of Chambers v. Missis-
sippi and Rock v. Arkansas.217 Admission of polygraph evidence
to impeach or corroborate the testimony of a witness might clear
the hurdles raised by the due process and compulsory process
clauses. Although those clauses command that a defendant be
allowed "to call witnesses whose testimony is material and favor-
able to his defense,' '218 the command may be satisfied by the
corroboration or impeachment approach. If a party is unable to
procure any independent evidence of an issue on which he would
like to offer polygraph testimony, then given the dubious trust-
worthiness of polygraph evidence, the state's legitimate interest in
the exclusion of unreliable evidence is likely to outweigh the due
process and compulsory process concerns. Stated differently, such
evidence is less "material" under these circumstances. Once inde-
pendent testimony is presented on the issue, which the polygraph
evidence may corroborate or impeach, the materiality of the evi-
dence increases, and the constitutional concerns may outweigh the
state's legitimate interest in exclusion. The materiality is even higher
under the Vitello approach, which limits the use of polygraph
evidence to the impeachment or corroboration of the defendant.
Perhaps the greatest drawback to the admission of polygraph
evidence for impeachment or corroboration is that it heightens
concerns about the potential for unfair prejudice. One can imagine
the impact upon a jury when an examiner testifies that a polygraph
examination indicates that the defendant was lying when he claimed
innocence. The judge will instruct the jury that the examiner's
testimony should be used only to determine the weight given the
witness's testimony, not as independent evidence that the defendant
did or did not commit the crime. As a practical matter, however,
such a limiting instruction will be of little help to the defendant.
216 See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536.
217 See supra notes 115-43 and accompanying text.
21 Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 (quoting United States v. Valenzuela, 458 U.S. 858, 867
(1967)).
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A better approach would allow the examiner to state only that the
defendant was deceptive, without specifying the results on partic-
ular questions .219
Finally, adoption of the impeachment or corroboration ap-
proach by the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, indicates that circuit's
belief that polygraph evidence is nearing the Frye/Downing stan-
dard of admissibility for scientific evidence. The rationale for
admitting reputation evidence of character is not that because such
evidence is used only for impeachment or corroboration it need
not be trustworthy. The rationale is that such evidence is "justified
by 'overwhelming considerations of practical convenience." ' °0 One's
opinion of another's reputation is "the slow growth of months and
years, the resultant picture of forgotten incidents, passing events,
habitual and daily conduct, presumably honest because disinter-
ested, and safer to be trusted because prone to suspect.''221 Thus,
to have reached a level of acceptability for impeachment or cor-
roboration, polygraph evidence must be standing upon the thresh-
old of the Frye/Downing standard.
E. Unconditional Admissibility Upon An Adequate Foundation
The Court of Military Justice offers the most liberal approach
to polygraph evidence in the federal system.m After an extensive
discussion of the history and reliability of polygraph evidence, the
Court of Military Appeals held that a defendant has the right to
attempt to lay a sufficient foundation for the admission of poly-
graph evidence:
In our assessment, the state of the polygraph technique is such
that, depending on the competence of the examiner, the suitability
of the examinee, the nature of the particular testing process
employed, and such other factors as may arise, the results of a
particular examination may be as good as or better than a good
119 Cf. Miller, 874 F.2d at 1262 (holding that while the fact that the defendant gave
his admissions shortly after failing a polygraph test was admissible to support the reliability
of those admissions, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to
introduce the specific questions and answers given during the test).
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478 (1948) (quoting People v. Van
Gaasbeck, 82 N.E. 718, 721 (1907)).
2, Badger v. Badger, 88 N.Y. 546, 552 (1882).
"I See United States v. Pope, 30 M.J. 1188 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990); United States v.
McKinne, 29 M.J. 825 (A.C.M.R. 1989); United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246 (C.M.A.
1987).
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deal of expert and lay evidence that is routinely and uncritically
received in criminal trials. 2 3
This liberal approach is easy to justify. First, it may be con-
stitutionally mandated by the Chambers and Rock interpretations
of the due process and compulsory process clauses. Second, the
trial court retains the ability, on a case-by-case basis, to exclude
polygraph evidence for any reason that is supported by the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The only foreseeable problem with this ap-
proach is that it may waste a lot of trial time as parties unsuccess-
fully attempt to meet the necessary foundation requirements. The
experience of the military courts with this liberal approach likely
will determine the future direction taken by other courts in the
federal system.
CONCLUSION
It is tempting to say that, given the liberal approaches adopted
by the Eleventh Circuit and the military courts, polygraph evidence
is making progress on its odyssey toward judicial legitimacy. It is
tempting to see these approaches as signs that the tide of polygraph
evidence is eroding the walls of inadmissibility fortified by the Frye
and Downing standards. But it would be ironic to find that a
method of deception detection that has existed, in one form or
another, for over four thousand years224 has suddenly become
''sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs." 225 And, it should be noted
that the crumbling of the walls of inadmissibility, foreshadowed
by several federal district court opinions during the 1970s, never
happened: by the early 1980s, the walls looked as strong as ever. 226
The Piccinonna approach best balances the competing concerns
presented by an evolving area of evidence law and a type of
evidence whose trustworthiness is impossible to pinpoint defini-
tively. The polygraph's reliability may or may not be improving
with the development of better equipment and the imposition of
stricter examiner standards. In the end, "If anything is clear, it is
223 Gipson, 24 M.J. at 253.
2'4 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
225 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
See Sevilla, supra note 2, at 6.
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that the battle over polygraph reliability will continue to rage." 27
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27 Gipson, 24 M.J. at 253.
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